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COMMENTS
A RECONSIDERATION OF HAITIAN
CLAIMS FOR WITHHOLDING OF
REMOVAL UNDER THE CONVENTION
AGAINST TORTURE
Henry Mascia

I.

INTRODUCTION

As they brought Jacque' to the National Penitentiary in
Port-au-Prince, his stomach dropped, and his heart skipped a
beat. After spending only two days in the prison, he discovered
that the conditions were worse than he had thought. They had
forced him to stay in this 25' by 15' by 15' cell with forty other
men. Because there were no toilets, he had to defecate in a bag
and dump it out of the window. He got no sleep the first night
because the wind blew the stench of fecal matter into his cell
causing him to throw up the paltry portion of rice and beans
they had given him the day before. During the moments when
his body adjusted to the stench, he began to doze off, but the
bites from rats, with whom he also shared this cell, disturbed
even these short moments of rest. The next day, they served
him only one meal of rice and beans again. Jacque became overwhelmed at the thought of spending even another minute this
way. His lawyer told him that the Haitian authorities would
release him if a member of Jacque's immediate family in Haiti
agreed to take responsibility for him. Although he was born in
Haiti, he came to the United States with his entire family when
he was just a boy; so, there was nobody to sponsor him.
1 Jacque is a fictional character, but his experience is based on the actual
conditions in the National Penitentiary in Port-au-Prince, where criminal deportees from the United States are held indefinitely.
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Jacque could not take it anymore. He had to ask the
guards for more food; otherwise, he would die of hunger. The
other deportees warned him not to complain, but desperation
clouded his judgment. The guards assumed that, as a criminal
deportee from the United States, Jacque was just trying to start
trouble and decided to teach him a lesson. They brought him
out of the cell and struck him repeatedly with a metal rod. As
the blows reigned down on his back, he could not help recalling
the words of his lawyers: "I am sorry Jacque. The judges ruled
that the conditions in the Haitian prisons do not constitute torture." If this is not "torture," he wondered, then what is?
Some immigrants in removal proceedings are eligible for
Withholding of Removal under the Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("Convention against Torture"). 2 The United States
signed the Convention against Torture on April 18, 1988. 3 On
October 21, 1994, the Senate ratified the treaty, 4 conditioning
its advice and consent on one declaration, two reservations, and
five understandings. 5 These understandings were incorporated
into the implementing regulations, which became effective on
March 22, 1999.6 The implementing regulations provide that
the removal of an individual will be withheld if the applicant
demonstrates that "it is more likely than not that he or she
would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal." 7 The regulations define torture as:
[a]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or her or a third person information or a con2 Withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3)(B) of the Act and withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture, 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)
(2006).
3 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, pmbl., Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into
force June 26, 1987), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partl/chapterIV/treatyl4.asp
[hereinafter Convention against
Torture].
4 Id.

5 Id.
6 Regulations

Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg.
8478, 8478 (Feb. 19, 1999) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 3, 103, 208, 235, 238, 240,
241, 253, 507).
7 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2).
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fession, punishing him or her for an act he or she or a third person
has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or her or a third person, or for any reason
based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering
is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
8
capacity.

The regulations also state that "[i]n order to constitute torture,
an act must be specifically intended to inflict severe physical or
mental pain or suffering. An act that results in unanticipated
or unintended severity of pain and suffering is not torture." 9
U.S. Courts have interpreted the definition of torture to
contain five elements:
(1) an act causing severe physical or mental pain or suffering; (2)
intentionally inflicted; (3) for a proscribed purpose; (4) by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official who has custody or physical control of the victim; and (5) not
arising from lawful sanctions. 10

Courts have interpreted the requirement that a given act
must be "intentionally inflicted" to constitute torture in a variety of ways. Nevertheless, the predominant interpretation is
that the regulations create a specific intent requirement.',
The critical issue in many petitions for withholding of removal under the Convention against Torture is whether the
treatment that the immigrant will suffer amounts to the statutory definition of torture. 12 Courts have been reluctant to extend this form of relief to criminal deportees, like Jacque, who
are in danger of being detained indefinitely in Haitian
prisons.

13

8 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1) (emphasis added).
9 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(5).
10 In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 297 (BIA 2002).
11 See Francois v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 645, 651 (3d Cir. 2006) (relying on Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 2005)); Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 148
(3d Cir. 2005); Cadet v. Bulger, 377 F.3d 1173, 1191 (11th Cir. 2004); In re J-E-, 23
I. & N. Dec. 291, 301 (BIA 2002).
12 See generally, e.g., Auguste, 395 F.3d at 123; Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d
463 (3d Cir. 2003); Thelemaque v. Ashcroft, 363 F. Supp. 2d 198 (D. Conn. 2005);
In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291 (BIA 2002).
13 See generally, e.g., Toussaint v. Attorney General, 455 F.3d 409 (3d Cir.
2006); Francois,448 F.3d 645; Auguste, 395 F.3d 123; Thelemaque, 363 F. Supp. 2d
198.
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This Comment sets forth three major contentions. First, a
general intent should satisfy the "intentionally inflicted" requirement of 8 C.F.R. § 208.18. Second, the analytical framework courts have used is flawed because it does not accurately
reflect the concept of specific intent as it is understood in the
criminal context. Third, Haitian authorities specifically intend
to inflict severe pain and suffering on criminal deportees as a
result of the widespread fear of and prejudice against them.
Therefore, the conditions in Haitian prisons satisfy the regulatory definition of "torture."
The second Part of this Comment will recount the history of
non-refoulement as a doctrine. The third Part of this Comment
will review the history of the Convention against Torture. The
fourth Part of this Comment will discuss the statutory and regulatory implementation of the Convention against Torture. The
fifth Part of this Comment will examine how U.S. courts and
administrative agencies have interpreted the "intentionally inflicted" requirement. The sixth and final Part of this Comment
will argue that general intent should be enough to satisfy the
requisite intent element for Withholding of Removal under the
Convention against Torture, set forth a new analytical framework using the specific intent standard, and, finally, demonstrate how the specific intent doctrine has been misapplied to
prison conditions in Haiti.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND ON REFUGEES AND REFOULEMENT

Beginnings of "non-refoulement"

The term "non-refoulement" is derived from the French
word "refouler" meaning "to drive back." 14 Before the early to
mid-nineteenth century, "formal agreements between states for
the reciprocal surrender of subversives, dissidents, and traitors"
controlled a state's policy toward refugees. 15 However, popular
support grew for those "fleeing their own country for political
reasons."'16 In 1933, Article 3 of the 1933 Convention Relating
to the International Status of Refugees (the "1933 Convention")
14 Guy S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 69 (Oxford
Clarendon Press 1996) (1983).
15 Id.
16 Id. at 70.
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set forth the idea of non-refoulement for the first time. 17 The
relevant portion of Article 3 reads:
Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes not to remove or
keep from its territory by application of police measures, such as
expulsions or non-admittance at the frontier (refoulement), refugees who have been authorised to reside there regularly, unless
the said measures
are dictated by reasons of national security or
8
public order.1
The 1933 Convention, while laying the ground work for refugee law today, 19 had a narrow scope, as it only applied to "Russian, Armenian and assimilated refugees" 20 and was only
signed by eight States. 2 ' Future conventions and agreements
22
would have a much wider scope.
B.

1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
1.

Scope

The principle of non-refoulement set forth in Article 33 of
the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (hereinafter "1951 Convention") has served "both as a model and a textual basis for many subsequent human rights treaties that have
incorporated the principle of non-refoulement. ''2 3 Article 33
reads:
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where
his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion.
17 Convention relating to the International Status of Refugees, art. III, Oct.
18, 1933, 159 L.N.T.S. 199, 205 (entered into force July 26, 1935) [hereinafter 1933
Convention]; David Weissbrodt & Isabel Hortreiter, The Principleof Non-Refoulement: Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Comparison with the Non-Refoulement
Provisions of Other InternationalHuman Rights Treaties, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTs. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1999).
18 1993 Convention, supra note 17, at 205.
19 Weissbrodt & Hbrtreiter, supra note 17, at 2.
20 1933 Convention, supra note 17, at 203.
21 GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 14, at 71. Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Egypt,

France, Italy, Norway and Czechoslovakia were the only signatories. 1933 Convention, supra note 17, at 201, 203.
22 See Conventions cited infra notes 24, 34.
23 Weissbrodt & Hortreiter, supra note 17, at 2.
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2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be
claimed by a refugee [sic] whom there are reasonable grounds for
regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is,
or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that
24
country.
Article 33 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees sets forth much broader protection than any other previous
agreement. 25 Contrary to previous agreements, which were designed for specific humanitarian crises, this agreement applied
generally to all those who fit the definition of a "refugee,"26 defined as anyone who had:
[a] well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; [or who, not having a nationality and being
outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of
such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to re27
turn to it].
In addition, the 1951 Convention was much more widely accepted than previous agreements, as demonstrated by the fact
that, as of 1999, one hundred and thirty-two states had signed
onto the agreement. 28 Finally, the 1951 Convention applies not
only to any refugees facing the threat of torture, but also to
those who face the threat of persecution. 29 A person suffers per30
secution when "his life or freedom would be threatened."
24

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 33, July 28, 1951, 176

U.N.T.S. 2545 (entered into force April 22, 1954) (official text in English and
French) [hereinafter 1951 Convention].
25
26

See Weissbrodt & Hbrtreiter, supra note 17, at 18.
Id.

27 Weissbrodt & Hortreiter, supra note 17, at 18 (quoting Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees, art. 1A, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 2545 (entered into
force April 22, 1954) (official text in English and French)). The United States
adopted a functionally equivalent definition of refugees in the Refugee Act of 1980.
See 8 U.S.C.A. §1101(A)(42)(A) (WEST 2006).

28
29

See Weissbrodt & Hortreiter, supra note 17, at 18.
See id.

30 See 1933 Convention, supra note 18, art. 3; Weissbrodt & Hortreiter, supra
note 17, at 21.
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2.

Exception

Despite the expanded scope of protection that the 1951
Convention provided refugees against refoulement, a signatory
could still return a refugee with a well-founded fear on account
of a protected ground if the refugee "committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee." 3 1 The 1951 Convention further provided that:
[tihe benefit of the present provision may not, however, be
claimed by a refugee [sic] whom there are reasonable grounds for
regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is,
or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that
country. 3 2
These provisions reflect another principle of refoulement - a
country need not put its own security in danger to accept a refugee. The principles of non-refoulement in the 1951 Convention 33 and the subsequent Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees (1967) ("1967 Protocol") 34 laid the foundation for the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("Convention against Tor35
ture" or "CAT").
III.
A.

CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE

History of the Convention

The Convention against Torture was signed to "make more
effective the struggle against torture and other cruel, inhuman
'36
or degrading treatment or punishment throughout the world.
Adopted on December 10, 1984, 3 7 opened for signature on February 4, 1985,3s and entered into force on June 26, 1987, 3 9 the
31 1951 Convention, supra note 24, art. 1F(b), at 156.
32

1951 Convention, supra note 24, art. 33(2), at 176.

33 See 1951 Convention, supra note 24.
34 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267
(entered into force Oct. 4, 1967) [hereinafter 1967 Protocol].
35 See Convention against Torture, supra note 3; see also Weissbrodt & Hrtreiter, supra note 17, at 2.
36 Convention against Torture, supra note 3, pmbl.
37 Id.
38 Zubeda

v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 471 (3d Cir. 2003).
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United States signed the Convention against Torture on April
18, 1988.40 It was referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations May 23, 1988,'4 1 and ratified by the Senate on October
27, 1990.42 It became binding on the United States in 1994
when the President delivered the ratifying documents to the
United Nations. 4 3 Today, one hundred and thirteen States are
44
signatories to the Convention against Torture.
B.

Non-refoulement policy, Article 3

The Convention against Torture is based principally on Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 7 of the Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, 45 both of
which are based on the fundamental principles of the 1975 Declaration against Torture. 4 6 However, the principle of nonrefoulement in the Convention against Torture does not have an
47
analogous provision in the 1975 Declaration against Torture.
Rather, the principles in the Convention against Torture have
their roots in the case law of the European Convention against
Human Rights. 48 The principle of non-refoulement under Article 3 of the Convention against Torture provides a much narrower scope of protection, as it protects only refugees in danger
of being subjected to torture, 4 9 "one of the most severe forms of
persecution." 50 The Convention against Torture defines torture
as:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or
a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any
Convention against Torture, supra note 3, pmbl.
See Zubeda, 333 F.3d at 471.
41 Convention against Torture, supra note 3, pmbl.
42 136 CONG. REC. S17, 486-501 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
43 Zubeda, 333 F.3d at 471.
44 Weissbrodt & Hortreiter, supra note 17, at 6.
39
40

45
46

Id.
Id.

47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Convention against Torture, supra note 3, art. 3.
50

Weissbrodt & Hortreiter, supra note 17, at 16.
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kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain
or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful
51
sanctions.
This narrow application is warranted because the Convention against Torture does not allow a state to return a refugee
that could be a danger to society, as provided for in previous
agreements with a broader scope of protection, such as the 1933
52
Agreement and the 1951 Agreement.
C.

Senate's advice and consent

The U.S. Constitution gives the President the power to
make treaties, with the advice and consent of the Senate. 53 On
May 10, 1988, President Reagan referred the Convention
against Torture to the Committee on Foreign Relations, 54 accompanied by a letter from the Department of State outlining
the background of the Convention against Torture and recommending various conditions for the Senate to adopt. 5 5 President
George H. W. Bush, concerned that President Reagan's package
"faced substantial opposition from human rights groups and
56
other interested parties," sent a revised package of conditions.
5
7
The Senate ratified the Convention against Torture, and attached several reservations, understandings, declarations and
provisos (collectively "Conditions") because "it was not possible
to negotiate a treaty that was acceptable to the United States in
58
all respects."
For the purpose of this Comment's focus on non-refoulement, the most relevant Condition is the first understanding
which states "[t]hat with reference to Article 1, the United
States understands that, in order to constitute torture, an act
must be specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental
51 Convention against Torture, supra note 3, art. 1.
52 See supra Part II.B.2.
53 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, c. 2.
54 Convention against Torture, supra note 3, pmbl.
55 See id.
56 REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, S. ExEc. Doc. No. 30,

at App. A (1990).
57 See supra Part III.A.
58 Convention against Torture, supra note 3, pmbl.
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pain or suffering. .

. -59 This understanding differs from the
actual provision of Article 1 of the Convention against Torture,
which provides that torture is "any act by which severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted
on a person . . ."60 This understanding by the United States,
despite President Bush's efforts, drew criticism from some
members of the international community. The Netherlands, in
an objection dated February 26, 1996, stated, "[tihe Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands considers the following
understandings to have no impact on the obligations of the
United States of America under the Convention: II. 1 (a) This
understanding appears to restrict the scope of the definition of
61
torture under Article 1 of the Convention."

IV.

INCORPORATION OF THE CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE INTO U.S. LAW

A.

Statutory and Regulatory Implementation

Because the Convention against Torture is not self-executing, according to the Senate's final condition, 6 2 the United
States passed various statutes and regulations to implement
the provisions of the treaty, taking into account the Senate's
conditions. 63 On October 21, 1998, Congress passed the Foreign
Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act, which ordered the heads
of the appropriate agencies to prescribe regulations implement64
ing Article 3 of the Convention against Torture.
Accordingly, on February 19, 1999, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), at the time a division of the Department of Justice (the Department of Homeland Security took
over operations of the INS in 2002), set forth the interim rule
59 Id.,
60 Id.,
61 Id.,
62 Id.

Declarations and Reservations of the U.S. (emphasis added).
art. 1.
Declarations and Reservations of the U.S.
The declaration reads, "The Senate's advice and consent is subject to

the following declarations: (1) That the United States declares that the provisions
of article 1 through 16 of the Convention are not self-executing." Id.
63 See In re H-M-V, 22 I. & N. Dec. 256 (BIA 1998) (holding that the Board of
Immigration Appeals lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim based on Article 3 of
the Convention against Torture without a specific statute or regulation to implement the treaty).
64 FOREIGN AFFAIRS REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998, 8 U.S.C.S. §
1231 (LEXISNEXiS 2006).
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for the process by which an individual could seek relief under
Article 3 of the Convention against Torture. 65 Subsequently,
the interim rule was codified in the Code of Federal Regulations. 66 The regulations set forth two ways by which an applicant can be protected under Article 3 of the Convention against
Torture: withholding of removal and deferral of removal. 6 7 An
applicant qualifies for withholding or deferral of removal if the
applicant demonstrates that "it is more likely than not that he
or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of
removal." 68 The Regulations define torture the same way that
Article 3 of the Convention against Torture defines it.69 However, the regulations add an additional provision not found in
Article 3 of the Convention against Torture, which states that,
"[i]n order to constitute torture, an act must be specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering. An
act that results in unanticipated or unintended severity of pain
70
and suffering is not torture."
While the United States incorporated the CAT's definition
of torture into the implementing regulations, 7 1 the regulations
add an additional qualification for the phrase "intentionally inflicted." 72 The definition states that for an act to be torture, it
must be "specifically intended to inflict severe physical or
mental pain or suffering."73 This additional provision was added pursuant to the first condition of ratification set forth by
the U.S. Senate. 74 At least one country, the Netherlands, expressed its concern over the condition, as it was perceived "to
restrict the scope of the definition of torture under Article 1 of
75
the Convention [against Torture]."
65 Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg.
8478, 8478 (Feb. 19, 1999) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 3, 103, 208, 235, 238, 240,
241, 253, and 507).
66 8 C.F.R. § 208.16.
67 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(4).
68 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2).
69 Compare supra Part III.B., with 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1).
70 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(5) (emphasis added).
71 Compare supra Part III.B., with 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1).
72 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1).
73 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(5).
74 Convention against Torture, supra note 3, Declarations and Reservations of
the U.S.
75 Id., Objections of the Netherlands.
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V.

SPECIFIC INTENT ELEMENT FOR WITHHOLDING
OF REMOVAL UNDER

CAT

An applicant, such as Jacque, seeking relief under the Convention against Torture, need only show that it is more likely

than not that he would be subjected to torture if returned to the
proposed country of removal. One of the critical determinations

for the court is whether the applicant will suffer persecution, as
promulgated in the regulations. 76 The regulations set forth five
elements that must be satisfied for persecution to rise to the
level of torture.7 7 The element at issue in this Comment pro-

vides that an act of torture must be "specifically intended. 78s As
shown in the following section, the courts have had difficulty
determining the meaning of "intent." In fact, courts are somewhat divided on the issue of whether "intent," for the purposes
of relief under the Convention against Torture, requires general
79
or specific intent.
In cases where a government or group of individuals inflict
severe persecution in response to a specific attribute of the applicant, such as race, nationality, or political opinion, the intent
of the persecutors can be ascertained fairly easily. Thus, the
question of general or specific intent does not arise. However,
cases regarding deplorable prison conditions, where intent is
not so easily inferred, magnify the importance of interpreting
the "intent" element. Accordingly, many of the following cases
illustrate the determination of whether deplorable prison conditions constitute the regulatory definition of torture.
A.

Interpretationsof the Board of Immigration Appeals
1.

Majority Opinion of In re J-E-

The most influential case regarding the interpretation of

the "specifically intended" element of torture was decided by the
Board of Immigration Appeals (the "Board" or the "BIA") in In
76 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1).
77 In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 297 (BIA 2002).
78 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(5).
79 Compare Habtemicael v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 774, 782 (8th Cir. 2004), and
Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 473 (3d Cir. 2003), with Auguste v. Ridge, 395
F.3d 123, 147 (3d Cir. 2005), and Cadet v. Bulger, 377 F.3d 1173, 1190 (11th Cir.
2004).
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re J-E-.80 The Board, sitting en banc, heard a case in which a
Haitian immigrant sought Withholding of Removal under the
Convention against Torture ("CAT relief')."' The immigrant argued that he would be subjected to torture in Haiti because
criminal deportees, such as the Respondent, were known to be
"detained indefinitely in prison facilities where prisoners are
82
subjected to inhuman conditions and police mistreatment."
The critical question for the Board was whether indefinite detention, inhuman prison conditions, and police mistreatment fit
within the regulatory definition of torture.8 3 The definition of
torture, according to the majority, included a specific intent requirement.8 4 The Board supported this interpretation by citing
the legislative history of the treaty.8 5 The Board declared that
the "ratification documents8 6 make it clear that [the phrase specifically intended] is a 'specific intent' requirement, not a general intent requirement. ' 8' 7 Therefore, a torturer must intend to
bring about severe pain and suffering, not merely know that his
deliberate actions will result in severe pain or suffering, for a
given act to meet the statutory definition of torture.8 8
Applying this standard of intent, the Board analyzed the
indefinite detention policy, inhumane prison conditions, and police mistreatment separately.8 9 The Board concluded that none
met the regulatory definition of torture. The Board reasoned
that Haiti's detention policy was not specifically intended to
bring about severe physical or mental pain or suffering.9 0
The Board stated, "Although Haitian authorities are intentionally detaining criminal deportees knowing that the detention facilities are substandard, there is no evidence that they
80 See In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 297.
81 See id. at 292-94.

Id. at 299.
See id.
See id. at 298.
See id. at 301.
One of the ratification documents referred to by the Court states explicitly
that "[b]ecause specific intent is required, an act that results in unanticipated and
unintended severity of pain and suffering is not torture for purposes of this Convention." REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, S. ExEc. Doc. No.
30, at 14 (1990).
87 In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 298, 301.
88 See id. at 298, 301.
89 See id. at 299-302.
90 See id. at 300; 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(5).
82
83
84
85
86
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are intentionally and deliberately creating and maintaining
such prison conditions in order to inflict torture."9 1 Therefore,
the prison conditions were not "specifically intended" to bring
2
about severe pain or suffering
The Board further determined that Haitian prison conditions were the result of "budgetary and management
problems." 93 The Board supported this conclusion by noting
that "the Haitian Government 'freely permitted the ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross], the Haitian Red
Cross, MICAH [International Civilian Mission for Support in
Haiti], and other human rights groups to enter prisons and police stations, monitor conditions, and assist prisoners with med94
ical care, food, and legal aid."'
2.

Dissenting opinions of In re J-E-

The dissenting opinion of Paul Wickham Schmidt, joined by
four other members, criticized the majority opinion's separate
analysis of indefinite detention, prison conditions, and police
mistreatment. 95 According to the dissent, "[i]n essence, the majority errs by looking at the various factors that contribute to
the abuse of Haitian returnees in isolation, and not as a
whole." 9 6 The Wickham dissent also implied that to satisfy the
intent requirement, the Haitian government need only intentionally detain the deportees with knowledge of what will happen in the deplorable prison conditions. 9 7 The dissent further
stated, "[t]hese authorities have continued the policy of detaining returnees with the full knowledge ... that returnees will be
forced to endure horrific prison conditions as well as starvation,
beatings, and other forms of physical abuse."98 To further illustrate, the dissent supported its claim that Haitian prison conditions fall within the meaning of 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1) by
91 In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 301.
92

Id.

93 Id.
94 Id. at 301.
95 See supra Part IV.A.1.
96 In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 309.
97 See id. at 307-08.
98 Id. at 307 (emphasis added).
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noting that, "[tihe Government of Haiti cannot claim that it
does not know what happens to detainees in its prisons." 9 9
The dissenting opinion of Lory Rosenberg also opposed the
majority's interpretation of the phrase "specifically intended." 10 0 According to the Rosenberg dissent, the phrase
"specifically intended" does not impose a specific intent requirement as the term is used in criminal law. The Rosenberg dissent asserted that 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(5) "reflects only that
something more than an accidental consequence is necessary to
establish the probability of torture."'' 1 It pointed out the difficulties in ascertaining the subjective intent of any individual, as
reflected in the various standards of proof for different areas of
10 2
law such as criminal law, torts, and statutory civil rights.
The imposition of a specific intent requirement, according to the
Rosenberg dissent, would make it "difficult, if not impossible, to
10 3
prove specific intent in a prospective context."
Since the In re J-E- decision, it has served as a foundation
for the analysis of the intent requirement for Withholding of Removal under CAT. 10 4 While some of the holdings of In re J-Ehave been repudiated, 0 5 the central holding on the regulatory
intent requirement for acts constituting torture has been fol07
lowed 1 0 6 with only a few exceptions.
B.

Third CircuitInterpretations
1.

Zubeda v. Ashcroft

In Zubeda v. Ashcroft, the Court reviewed the decision of
the BIA, reversing an Immigration Judge's grant of CAT relief
to Takky Zubeda. Zubeda testified that she and her family were
raped in her home country, the Democratic Republic of
99 Id. at 308 (emphasis added).
100 Id. at 316.
101 Id.
102 In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 316.
103 Id.
104 See Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 2005); Khouzam v. Ashcroft,
361 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2004); Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463 (3d Cir. 2003);
Thelemaque v. Ashcroft, 363 F. Supp. 2d 198 (D. Conn. 2005).
105 See generally Khouzam, 361 F.3d 161.
106 See generally Auguste, 395 F.3d 123; Thelemaque, 363 F. Supp. 2d 198.
107 See, e.g., Zubeda, 333 F.3d at 463.
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Congo. 0 8 The Court vacated the BIA's opinion and remanded
the case to the Immigration Judge. 0 9 The Court criticized the
BIA's decision for a number of deficiencies. For example, the
Court took strong exception to the determination of the likelihood of torture1 1 ° and the BIA's analysis of country reports.",
However, the Court never criticized the BIA's interpretation of
the intent necessary for CAT relief.
Nevertheless, the Court dedicated a substantial portion of
the opinion to an interpretation of the regulations' provision
that an act must be "specifically intended."1" 2 Beginning its
analysis, the Court stated explicitly, "[allthough the regulations
require that severe pain or suffering be intentionally inflicted,
we do not interpret this as a specific intent requirement.
Rather, we conclude that the Convention simply excludes severe pain or suffering that is the unintended consequence of an
intentional act."11 3 The Court supported this interpretation by
noting that the threat of severe physical pain or suffering
amounts to torture." 14 The Court reasoned that such a provision demonstrates that "the Convention does not require that
the persecutor actually intend to cause the threatened result. It
is sufficient if the persecutor causes severe psychological suffering by threatening beatings for one of the specified purposes
such as extracting information or coercing a confession."" 5 According to the Court, an applicant seeking CAT relief need only
show that the persecutor would cause severe suffering for a
specified purpose to satisfy the intent element set forth in the
regulations. Finally, the Court supported its interpretation on
a pragmatic level noting that to require "an alien to establish
the specific intent of his/her persecutors could impose insurmountable obstacles to affording the very protections the com108 See id. at 467.

109 See id. at 480.
110 See id. at 475 n.13. ("The BIA's reference to isolated instances of mistreatment is both puzzling and troubling. The relevant reports here describe mistreatment in the DRC as systematic and large scale, not isolated instances as the BIA

suggests."). Id.
111 See Zubeda, 333 F.3d at 475.

112 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(5).
113 Zubeda, 333 F.3d at 473 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
114 Id. at 474.
115 Id.
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munity of nations sought to guarantee under the Convention
116
Against Torture."
Although this interpretation stands in stark contrast to the
7
BIA's specific intent requirement announced in In re J-E-,"'
the Court never addressed the inconsistency in its discussion on
the requisite intent. While the Court discussed and set forth a
standard of intent for CAT relief, the Court's decision did not
necessarily depend on it.
2. Auguste v. Ridge
Conversely, the Third Circuit, in Auguste v. Ridge, directly
addressed the requisite intent for Withholding of Removal
under CAT." 8 Auguste involved the petition for Deferral of Removal by a Haitian national claiming that the deplorable conditions and indefinite detention policy in Haiti amount to the
regulatory definition of torture. 1' 9 In contrast to its previous
decision in Zubeda, the Court concluded that implementing the
regulations of the Convention against Torture requires a showing of specific intent for an act to be considered "torture."'1 20
The Court in Auguste relied primarily on the ratification
history of the Convention against Torture.' 2 ' The Court cited a
cover letter from the Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs,
Department of State to the Chairman of the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, which stated that the understanding reflects the Department of State's position that specific intent is
required for an act to constitute torture. 12 2 The Court supported its conclusion that the phrase "specifically intended"
amounts to a specific intent requirement by noting that the
"term 'specific intent' by its ordinary usage in American law as
the 'intent to accomplish the precise criminal act that one is
later charged with."' 23 Auguste argued that requisite intent
116 Zubeda, 333 F.3d at 474; see also Karen Musalo, IrreconcilableDifferences?
Divorcing Refugee Protectionsfrom Human Rights Norms, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L.
1179, 1210 (1994) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
117 In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 301 (BIA 2002).
118 See Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 2005).

119 See id. at 129.
120

121
122
123

See id. at 123.
See id. at 139.
Id. at 131 n.3.
Auguste, 395 F.3d at 139 (quoting In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 301 (BIA

2002)).
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can be satisfied as long as the actor had knowledge that his actions might cause severe pain or suffering. The Court rejected
this argument on the grounds that both the President and the
Senate understood that the definition of torture included a specific intent requirement. 124 Therefore, the Court was "obliged
to give that understanding effect." 12 5 Finally, the Court
explained,
[w]e also believe it to be telling that both Presidents Reagan and
Bush submitted the condition interpreting Article 1 with the 'specifically intended' language as an understanding, and not as a reservation or declaration. This suggests to us that the commonly
understood meaning at the time of ratification was that, at least
to the United States, the specific intent standard was consistent
with a reasonable interpretation of the language in Article 1.126
As a result, the Court found that mere knowledge that one's
deliberate actions will result in severe pain and suffering did
not satisfy the requisite intent under the regulatory definition
of torture. 12 7 Rather, one must "expressly intend to achieve the
forbidden act. '128 After determining the legal issues, the Court
applied the law to the facts. The Court concluded that there
was no evidence that the Haitian authorities placed detainees
in deplorable conditions to inflict severe pain and suffering and
denied Auguste's petition. 129
3.

Lavira v. Attorney General of the U.S.

In subsequent cases, the Third Circuit faithfully followed
the Auguste precedent on specific intent. 130 Then, in Lavira v.
Attorney General of the U.S., the Court was forced to apply the
specific intent standard to a case brought by a disabled, HIVpositive criminal deportee from Haiti. In the end, the Court remanded the case so that the Immigration Judge ("IJ") could re124

Id. at 142.

125

Id.

126

Id. at 125.

See id. at 148.
Id. at 145.
129 See Auguste, 395 F.3d at 153-54.
130 See generally, e.g., Toussaint v. Attorney General, 455 F.3d 409 (3d Cir.
2006); Francois,448 F.3d 645; Auguste, 395 F.3d 123; Thelemaque, 363 F. Supp. 2d
198.
127

128
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examine several issues. 13 1 In this Comment, the analysis of
Lavira will focus exclusively on the holding addressing the spe132
cific intent doctrine.
Maurice Lavira is an HIV-positive, above-the-knee amputee 3 3 convicted for purchasing drugs. 3 4 Michelle Karshan, an
expert in the Haitian prison system, testified that Lavira,
"would not receive any meaningful medical treatment," 13 5 that
"Lavira would face the exceptionally dire prospect of losing 30
pounds soon after being incarcerated," and that "death would
follow shortly after."1 36 Lavira argued that "to place him knowingly in the disease-infested Haitian facility is to intentionally
subject him to severe pain and suffering, even death." Lavira
argued that "his obvious vulnerability and its nearly inevitable
consequences. . .satisfy the requirement that the harm that
awaits him is specifically intended." 137 Yet, the Immigration
Judge denied his claim for withholding of removal under the
Convention of Torture and ordered him to be deported. 38 Attempting to follow the specific intent principle set forth in Auguste, the IJ stated:
To be sure the respondent does have certain disabilities, but there
is no evidence that has been submitted other than evidence relating to the general overall deplorable conditions that could lead
this Court to conclude that the respondent would be placed or detained upon this return to Haiti with an intent to inflict severe
139
pain or suffering.
131 Lavira v. Att'y Gen. of the United States, 478 F.3d 158, 172 (3d. Cir. 2007).
132 The holding in Lavira addressed two other major issues. First, the Court
had to decide whether Lavira's crime constituted a particularly serious crime.
Lavira, 478 F.3d at 172. Second, the court had to decide whether Lavira's status
as an HIV-positive amputee would make it "more likely than not" that Lavira
would suffer at the hands of prison guards. See id. at 169. Incidentally, the facts
set forth in this comment, see infra Part VI.B, are sufficient to prove that criminal
deportees as a whole stand out more than the average prisoner in the Haitian
National Penitentiary, and thus, it is more likely that they will suffer physical
abuse by the Haitian prison guards.
133 Lavira, 478 F.3d 158, 159.
134 Id. at 158-59.
135 Id. at 171.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 169.
138 Lavira, 478 F.3d at 172.
139 Id. at 164 (quoting the Immigration Judge).
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The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the Immigration Judge's decision, 140 but the Third Circuit remanded the
case based, in part, on its modification of the specific intent doctrine. 1 4 1 First, the Court reaffirmed that "poor prison conditions did not constitute torture because they were not
specifically directed by officials towards him or intended by officials to cause severe pain and suffering. " 1 4 2 Then, recognizing
the difficulty in proving intent, the Court declared:
[Diemonstrating proof of intent is necessarily an inferential endeavor in nearly every case; we must draw conclusions about actors' mental states from the conduct of those actors. In the CAT
setting, those inferences are based on reports of the current activity in the proposed country of removal and predictions about what
results will befall an individual after removal .... [I]n this (the
CAT claim) setting, the IJ must make predictions about future
states of mind. The CAT's implementing regulations recognize
these concerns ....As such, IJs must be careful given the predic1 43
tive and thus necessarily speculative inquiry into intent.
Accordingly, the Court announced that "intent can be proven
through evidence of willful blindness," but mere recklessness
could not satisfy the specific intent element under CAT. 144 The
Court attempted to distinguish Lavira from other criminal deportees by exclaiming:
There is no dispute that the conditions are rife with disease
and comparable to a 'slave ship.' Severe pain is not 'a' possible
consequence that 'may result' from placing Lavira in the facility,
it is the only plausible consequence given what Haitian officials
1 45
know about their own facility.
Nevertheless, it appears that the Court based its decision
primarily on the fact that Lavira, if deported, would suffer in
ways different from the general prison population. For example, in the section of the opinion distinguishing Lavira from Auguste, the Court stated, "[t]here was nothing about Auguste's
physical or mental condition which set him apart from the peti140

Id.

141 See generally id.
142
143

Id. at 169.
Id. at 171.

144 Lavira, 478 F.3d at 171.
145

Id. at 170.
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tioner in Matter of J-E- or the general population incarcerated
at the facility .... "146 Even more illustrative is the Court's
characterization of Auguste's claim: "Auguste's claim failed because he was understood to be presenting a generalized claim
against the Haitian facility no different from the matter
presented in Matter of J-E-."147 In contrast, the Court described
Lavira's claim as an "individualized attack on his removal to
148
Haiti."
C.

Interpretationsby other Circuits
1.

Cadet v. Bulger

In Cadet v. Bulger, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
reviewed a petition by Jean Neckson Cadet seeking relief under
the Convention against Torture. 149 The Eleventh Circuit evaluated Cadet's claim by separately analyzing Haiti's policy of indefinite detention, inhumane prison conditions, and police
brutality, much in the same way that the Board of Immigration
Appeals did in In re J-E-.150 Additionally, the Court took the
same position as the Third Circuit did in Auguste,1 5 1 denying
Cadet's claim on the grounds that neither Haiti's policy of indefinite detention, nor the inhumane prison conditions, nor the
"isolated" instances of police brutality constituted torture because none of them were created or maintained for the purpose
1 52
of bringing about severe pain or suffering.
The Court's reasoning in Cadet focused primarily on In re
J-E-. 153 The Court declared: "In light of... our required Chevron deference, we cannot say that the distinction drawn by the
BIA and legal conclusions in J-E- are arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable."1 5 4 Indeed, the Court agreed with many of the
Id. at 168.
Id. at 169.
148 Id. at 172.
149 Cadet v. Bulger, 377 F.3d 1173 (11th Cir. 2004).
150 Compare Cadet v. Bulger, 377 F.3d 1173, 1179-90 (11th Cir. 2004), with In
re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 299-302 (BIA 2002).
151 Compare Cadet, 377 F.3d 1173, with Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123 (3d
Cir. 2005).
152 Cadet, 377 F.3d at 1191.
153 See id. at 1191-95.
154 Id. at 1195.
146
147
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BIA's findings. 15 5 While the Court took great care to compare
In re J-E- and this case, 15 6 the Court neglected to include a discussion regarding the grounds for applying a specific intent
standard.157
D.

PredominantInterpretationand its Analytical Framework

Notwithstanding the dissent in In re J-E-, the Zubeda decision, and the suggestion in Habtemicael,158 the BIA and many
circuit courts read 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1) and § 208.18(a)(5) to
mean that a persecutor must intend to bring about severe pain
and suffering, not merely foresee that his deliberate actions will
result in severe pain or suffering. 159 As a result, those seeking
Withholding of Removal under the Convention against Torture
must prove that those who would torture them would do so for
the purpose of causing severe pain and suffering.
Supporters of a specific intent requirement rely heavily on
the Senate's understandings and ratifying documents which express the Executive's and the Senate's interpretation of the
phrases "intentionally inflicted" 160 and "specifically intended."' 6 ' For example, the Court in Auguste, citing the legislative history of the treaty, stated:
Thus, we are presented with a situation where both the President and the Senate, the two institutions of the federal government with treaty-making process [sic], agreed during the
ratification stage that their understanding of the definition of torture contained in Article 1 of the Convention included a specific
intent requirement. In our view, this is enough to require that
the understanding accompanying the United States' [sic] ratificaSee id. at 1194.
Id. at 1190-95.
157 See id. at 1185. Instead of reviewing the validity of the specific intent standard, the Court briefly discussed the "Chevron" deference. Id.
158 Habtemicael v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 774, 782 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that the
specific intent "requirement is satisfied if prolonged mental pain or suffering either is purposefully inflicted or is the foreseeable consequence of a deliberate
act.").
159 See Francois v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 645, 651 (3d Cir. 2006) (relying on Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 2005); Auguste, 395 F.3d at 148 (dismissing
Zubeda's discussion supporting the general intent standard as dicta); Cadet, 377
F.3d at 1191; In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 301 (BIA 2002).
160 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1).
161 8 C.F.R § 208.18(a)(5).
155
156
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tion of the Convention be given domestic legal effect, regardless of
any contention that the understanding may be invalid under international norms governing the formation of treaties or the
162
terms of the Convention itself.

Similarly, the BIA in In re J-E- cited a Committee on Foreign Relations Report, which states:
Further, the requirement of intent to cause severe pain and
suffering is of particular importance in the case of alleged menial
pain and suffering, as well as in cases where unexpectedly severe
physical suffering is caused. Because specific intent is required,
an act that results in unanticipated and unintended severity of
pain and suffering is not torture for purposes of this
16 3
Convention.
As Auguste controls the Third Circuit cases, and not
Zubeda, specific intent is the standard adopted by most
courts.16 4 The analytical framework, used by the court in Auguste, has two main components. First, the framework used by
the Court does not give a rebuttable presumption that a persecutor intended the natural and probable consequences of the
persecutor's deliberate actions. 16 5 Second, the framework analyzes indefinite detention, deplorable prison conditions, and police brutality separately.
1.

The Lavira Contradiction

The only way to reconcile the Auguste and Lavira 6 6 decisions regarding specific intent in the context of prison conditions requires the following: the specific intent standard is not
met when a persecutor intends a certain action but does not intend the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the action
162 Auguste, 395 F.3d at 143.
163 REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

S. ExEc. Doc. No. 30,

at 14 (1990).
164 See Francois,448 F.3d at 651 (relying on Auguste, 395 F.3d 123); Auguste,
395 F.3d at 148 (dismissing Zubeda's discussion supporting the general intent
standard as dicta); Cadet, 377 F.3d at 1191; In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 301.
165 See Auguste, 395 F.3d at 123.
166 Indeed, it is impossible to reconcile Lavira and In re J-E- as the Board in In
re J-E- stated explicitly: "Although Haitian authorities are intentionally detaining
criminal deportees knowing that the detention facilities are substandard, there is

no evidence that they are intentionally and deliberately creating and maintaining
such prison conditions in order to inflict torture." In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 301.
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which results in severe pain and suffering. 16 7 However, the
specific intent standard is satisfied when "severe pain is not 'a'
possible consequence that 'may result' from . .."16 a particular
action, but rather, ". . . it is the only plausible consequence
given what . . .,"169 the persecutor knows. In other words, the
persecutor is deliberately ignorant or willfully blind. While this
reconciliation is true to the normal definitions of specific intent
in a criminal law context, it ignores the facts. Although
Lavira'sprospective harm was greater in degree than Auguste's,
Toussaint's and Francois's,it was no more inevitable. By placing the criminal deportees in deplorable prison conditions indefinitely, all criminal deportees are guaranteed to endure severe
pain and suffering due to starvation, crowded facilities, violence, and general prejudice from the community. Therefore,
the doctrine of willful blindness applies exactly the same way to
healthy and disabled criminal deportees. Indeed the Board in
In re J-E- admitted that Haitian officials had knowledge of the
consequences of their actions, but the Board denied the claim
because the authorities did not intend to inflict severe pain and
1 70
suffering.
VI.
A.

ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Specific Intent and General Intent
1. Argument for adopting a General Intent Standard

While the original text of the Convention against Torture
states that torture need only be "intentionally inflicted,"171 the
U.S. signed the treaty with the understanding that the phrase
2
"intentionally inflicted" meant "specifically intended." 17 Although other signatories to the Convention against Torture objected, 173 the Senate and both Presidents Reagan and Bush
signed the convention with the understanding that specific in174
tent was required.
168

Auguste, 395 F.3d at 147.
Lavira v. Att'y Gen. of the United States, 478 F.3d 158, 170 (3d Cir. 2007).

169

Id.

170

In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 301.
Convention against Torture, supra note 3, art. 1.
Id., Declarations and Reservations of the U.S.
Id., Objections of the Netherlands.
See Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 143 (3d Cir. 2005).

167

171
172
173
174
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The specific intent requirement creates an unnecessarily
high burden on an applicant and is, therefore, inconsistent with
the purpose of the Convention against Torture. Both the Committee on Foreign Relations Report 175 and 8 C.F.R. § 208.18
(a)(5) state that the requisite standard of intent serves to exclude from the regulatory definition of torture acts that result
in unanticipated or unintended pain and suffering. If the purpose of the intent requirement is simply to exclude from the definition of torture acts that result in unanticipated suffering, the
specific intent requirement does so, but in the process excludes
many other torturous acts.
For example, the specific intent standard will not be met in
situations where the persecutor reasonably foresees that his actions will cause extreme pain or suffering, as long as some nonsadistic consideration, such as national security, motivated the
persecutor. The Court in Auguste stated this proposition explicitly. "I f the actor intended the act but did not intend the consequences of the act, i.e., the infliction of severe pain and
suffering, although such pain and suffering may have been a
foreseeable consequence, the specific intent standard would not
be satisfied.' 176 Finally, imposing a specific intent requirement,
and thereby unnecessarily narrowing the definition of torture,
would abrogate the very purpose of the Senate's ratification, "to
make more effective the struggle against torture and other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment throughout the world."1 77 While the Senate understood the treaty to
impose a specific intent standard, the court need not impose a
standard that effectively undercuts the purpose for which the
Senate ratified the treaty.
Moreover, a general intent standard would more accurately
implement the Senate's purpose for the intent element, excluding unanticipated pain and suffering, because "causing a prohibited result through accident, mistake, carelessness, or
absent-mindedness" 178 does not satisfy the general intent standard. A general intent standard would also more effectively
175 REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, S.

ExEc. Doc. No. 30,

at 14 (1990).
176 Auguste, 395 F.3d at 147 (emphasis added).
177 Convention against Torture, supra note 3, pmbl.
178 21 Am.JuR. 2D CriminalLaw § 127 (2006).
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achieve the purpose of the entire treaty, "to make more effective
the struggle against torture and other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment throughout the world,"'1 79 by
expanding the definition of torture and thereby offering relief to
more people who suffer cruel and inhumane punishment. Accordingly, circuits that have not directly ruled on the statutory
definition of torture should follow Zubeda, the dissent in In re
J-E-, and Habtemicael, and interpret 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1)
and § 208.18(a)(5) to impose a general intent standard.
2.

New Framework for Specific Intent Analysis

Even if a court concludes that specific intent, as understood
in American criminal law, is the requisite standard, the court
should not use the same analytical framework used in Auguste
and In re J-E-. First, the courts in those cases did not apply the
specific intent standard as it is commonly understood in American criminal law. Typically, the court, in a criminal proceeding,
will presume that a person intends all the natural and probable
consequences of their actions, regardless of whether it is a specific or general intent crime.'8 0 The Courts in Auguste and In re
J-E- never afforded the Petitioners the benefit of such a presumption."8 ' The Court in Auguste stated, "if the actor intended the act but did not intend the consequences of the act,
i.e., the infliction of severe pain and suffering, although such
pain and suffering may have been a foreseeable consequence, the
specific intent standard would not be satisfied." 18 2 This reasoning does not accurately reflect specific intent, as it is commonly
understood in criminal law because when a result is a foreseeable consequence (i.e. the result is the natural and probable
consequence of an action) a court will presume that the actor
intended such a result, unless there is some other evidence to
the contrary.' 8 3 While there may be some debate as to whether
there was evidence to the contrary, the Courts in Auguste and
In re J-E- failed to use, or even mention, the typical analysis
179 Convention against Torture, supra note 3, pmbl.
180 See 22 C.J.S. CriminalLaw § 43 (2006); see also Laws v. United States, 66
F.2d 870, 872 (10th Cir. 1933).
181 See generally Auguste, 395 F.3d 123; In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291 (BIA
2002).
182 Auguste, 395 F.3d at 146 (emphasis added).
1s3 See McDonald v. United States, 9 F.2d 506, 508 (8th Cir. 1925).
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used in criminal cases. Accordingly, this Comment asserts that
the natural and probable consequences of a persecutor's actions
which result in torture should give rise to a rebuttable presumption that the persecutor intended the result of his voluntary actions because this is the "ordinary usage [of specific
intent] in American law."18 4 This analysis is superior to the
analysis in Auguste and In re J-E- for two reasons. First, and
most importantly, it more accurately reflects the meaning of
specific intent as it is understood in criminal law. Second, when
torture results from the natural and probable consequences of a
deliberate act, the government, not the alien, would have to provide evidence that the persecutor did not specifically intend the
torturous results. This analysis is preferable because the government has the resources to do the complex investigation required to prove the intent of a persecutor located thousands of
miles away.
In addition, the Courts in Auguste and In re J-E- separately
analyzed Haiti's indefinite detention policy, the inhumane conditions, and police brutality. This type of analysis inadequately
attempts to isolate the legal issues, but in the process, distorts
the reality of conditions in Haitian prisons. An independent
analysis of indefinite detention does not capture the essence of
Haitian prison conditions. The horrific nature of Haitian prison
conditions is due in part to the fact that indefinite detention
occurs, not in a jail cell with running water and enough food for
the inmates, but in a squalid jail cell with forty other inmates
and with the only prospect of release being a bribe to the prison
officials or a family member sponsorship. Therefore, this Comment recommends that the BIA and the Circuit Courts of Appeals, first, allow a rebuttable presumption of specific intent
when torture is the natural and probable consequence of the
persecutor's deliberate actions. Second, the courts should analyze the Haitian prison system as a whole to determine whether
the system causes "torture."
B.

Haitian Prison Conditions and Specific Intent

The Board of Immigration Appeals and the Third Circuit
have chronicled the conditions of the Haitian prison system.
184 Auguste, 395 F.3d at 139 (quoting In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 301).
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Both the BIA and the Third Circuit had evidence that criminal
deportees from the United States are routinely held indefinitely
in Haitian prisons18 5 with other prisoners in the National Penitentiary.'l 6 The Court in Francoishad evidence that a deportee
may be released within three months if a close family member
agrees, in writing, to turn them self in to be arrested if the deportee commits a crime and is not apprehended. 8 7 The Court
in Toussaint also had evidence that bribery can secure the release of deportees. The Court in Auguste gave a thorough
description of the squalid conditions in which Haitian criminal
deportees are held indefinitely.18 8 The court noted that the
cells are so overcrowded that prisoners must sleep sitting or
standing up, and that roaches, rats, mice and lizards infest the
cells.' 8 9 The bags in which prisoners must defecate remain uncollected for days and often spill onto the floor.' 90 The Court
further observed that "malnutrition and starvation is a continuous problem." 19 1 In addition, the Court discussed reports of
prison guards abusing inmates using tactics such as electric
19 2
shock, burning with cigarettes, and choking.
Although the Courts appeared to have had a clear picture
of the Haitian prison system, they lacked one crucial piece of
evidence: the widespread hatred of criminal deportees from the
United States, and Americanized Haitians in general. In this
Comment, I hope to show new facts which will demonstrate that
the Haitian authorities, due to an unreasonable fear of criminal
deportees from the United States, place Americanized criminal
deportees into the prison system for the specific purpose of
causing severe pain and suffering on those criminal deportees,
thereby distinguishing future cases from In re J-E-, Auguste,
Toussaint, and Francois. Although the Courts did not have the
luxury of such evidence of the widespread hatred of criminal deportees in Haiti, the phenomenon is well documented.
185
186
187

Auguste, 395 F.3d at 129; In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 293.
Francois v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 645, 650 (3d Cir. 2006).
Id. at 650-51.

188 Auguste, 395 F.3d at 129.

Id. at 129.
190 Id.
191 Id.
189

192

Id.
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For example, The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights reports that "there is great hostility towards deportees." 193 Similarly, the International Crisis
Group described deportees from the United States as "society's
outcasts."19 4 A local Florida newspaper reported that American
criminal deportees even have trouble finding work, in part, due
to "the stigma of deportation."1 95 In addition, deportees are
often the target of violence and persecution simply because they
were deported from the U.S.196

Alternative Chance, a non-profit organization headed by
expert Michelle Karshan, who testified in Lavira, documented
some of the stories which illustrate the country-wide discrimination against criminal deportees:
Max (from Miami), Marc (aka "Gambino" from New York), and
Patrick (from New York). A police officer living in the same
neighborhood as Marc had a grudge against him because he was a
Criminal Deportee and had a car and money. The police and one
of the three men got into a fight in front of Munchies, a restaurant
in Petionville which is famous for carnival activities held in front
of the restaurant on some Sundays. The three deportees ran but
were later fingered by that one police officer and were arrested in
Petionville but were taken to the Thomassin 25 police station in a
suburb far above Petionville for the express purpose of beating
and torturing them. The three Criminal Deportees were severely
beaten and tortured by police. According to a [sic] eyewitness, a
few days later the police took the three Criminal Deportees out of
the police station and executed them. Marc's mother in New York
was said to have had a stroke as a result of learning of her son's
execution.1 9 7
193 Independent Expert, Situation of Human Rights in Haiti, 33, U.N. DOC.
E/CN.4/2006/115 (Jan. 24, 2006), available at http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage
_e.aspx?m=47 (follow "Report of the Independent expert on the situation of human

rights in Haiti, Lois Joinet" hyperlink).
194 Crisis Group Latin America/Caribbean

Report, Spoiling Security in Haiti,

at 7 (2005), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3485.
195 Ruth Morris, For Haitian deportees, American-style "grills'mark them as
targetsfor violence, hate, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Dec. 29, 2006, available at http:l/
www.alternativechance.org (follow "For Haitian deportees, American-style 'grills'
mark them as targets for violence, hate" hyperlink).
196 See id.
197 Michelle Karshan, Preliminary Reports by Michelle Karshan on Police Executions and Torture of Criminal Deportees in Haiti 2004-2006, Oct. 23, 2006,
available at http://www.alternativechance.org (follow "Articles about Deportation
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Alternative Chance documented numerous other abuses, as
well. Ultimately, the widespread xenophobia towards criminal
deportees resulted in outlandish accusations by the Haitian
government.
For instance, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights reported that government officials suspect the criminal
deportees of "masterminding the wave of kidnappings in Haiti
and to be involved in drug trafficking and the arms trade, based
upon the experience that they have gained from their criminal
activities in other countries."'198 Based on these unsubstantiated accusations, the Haitian government claims that the detention of criminal deportees is for security purposes, yet
"Haiti's government doesn't track how many crimes are committed by people who have been deported."'199 Moreover, "no hard
evidence exists to suggest they [criminal deportees] significantly affect crime in Haiti. ' 200 Indeed, many Haitians have
called on the government to substantiate their claims that criminal deportees from the United States are causing chaos in Haiti, but the Haitian government has yet to substantiate their
20 1
claim.
The Third Circuit, in Auguste, carefully explained that,
.if there is evidence that authorities are placing an individual in such conditions with the intent to inflict severe pain and
suffering on that individual, such an act may rise to the level of
torture should the other requirements of the Convention be
met."2 02 The facts set forth above demonstrate that Haitian au-

thorities place criminal deportees in horrid prison conditions
to Haiti, Alternative Chance, and Criminal Deportation in general" hyperlink;
then follow "Preliminary Report by Michelle Karshan on Police Executions & Torture of Criminal Deportees in Haiti 2004-2006" hyperlink).
198 General Secretariat, Haiti:Failed Justice or the Rule of Law? Challenges
Ahead for Haitiand the InternationalCommunity, $ 211, OEA/Ser/L/V1I. 123 doc.
6 rev 1 (Oct. 26, 2005), availableat http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/HAITI%20ENGLISH7X10%20FINAL.pdf [hereinafter "General Secretariat Report"].
199 Associated Press, U.S. lawmakers says deportees not fueling crime in Haiti,
HAITI NEWS, Dec. 11, 2006, available at http://haitinews.wordpress.com/2006/12/
13/us-lawmaker-says-deportees-not-fueling-crime-in-haiti/.
200 Id.
201

Amy Bracken, Influx of Deportees Stirs Anger in Haiti: Some Believe US

Policy Helped Boost Crime Rate, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 11, 2007, at A6, availa-

ble at http://www.boston.com/news/world/latinamerica/articles/
ofdeportees-stirs-anger-inhaiti/?page= full.
202 Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 154 (3d Cir. 2005).
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"with the intent to inflict severe pain and suffering" 20 3 due to
the widespread hatred of Haitian criminal deportees. Thus,
Haitian prison conditions satisfy the regulatory definition of
"torture" for claims of withholding of removal under the CAT.
The new facts set forth above also make clear that the policy of
indefinite detention is not merely a "preventative measure to
prevent returning criminals from further exacerbating the
country's already high levels of crime; '20 4 neither are they to
"deter criminal activity in Haiti." These facts also contravene
the Third Circuit's conclusion that CAT claims by Haitian criminal deportees are merely bemoaning ... "the general state of
20 5
affairs that constitute[s] conditions of confinement' in Haiti."
Rather, these policies, intended to punish, intimidate, and coerce criminal deportees, 20 6 were crafted specifically to target
criminal deportees from the United States. This fact belies any
assertion that pain and suffering will not be "directed at 'a particular petitioner."' 20 7 Finally, even if non-criminal deportees
suffer in the same prison conditions as criminal deportees, or
Haitian authorities do not create or maintain the entire prison
system for the purpose of torturing criminal deportees, the specific intent standard is still met because the policies which keep
criminal deportees in inhumane conditions for unreasonably
long periods of time were created specifically to cause severe
pain and suffering to criminal deportees.
CONCLUSION

While some courts have interpreted the "intentionally inflicted" requirement of 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 8(a)(1) to impose a specific intent standard, general intent should satisfy the
"intentionally inflicted" requirement of 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 8(a)(1)
for several reasons. First, the requisite intent was meant to exclude from the regulatory definition of torture deliberate acts
that resulted in unanticipated or unintended pain and suffering. A general intent standard would effectively serve that pur203 Id.
204 Francois v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 645, 650 (3d Cir. 2006).
205 Toissaint v. Att'y Gen. of the United States, 455 F.3d 409, 416 (3d Cir.

2006) (quoting Auguste, 395 F.3d at 137).
206 In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 298 (BIA 2002).
207 Toissaint, 455 F.3d at 416 (quoting Francois,448 F.3d at 652).
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pose, while a specific intent standard will exclude even those
deliberate acts committed by persecutors who foresee that their
acts will result in torture. Second, a specific intent standard
would disqualify almost every applicant 20 8 because any innocuous explanation for torture removes the conduct from the regulatory definition of torture.
Even if courts determine that the regulations require a specific intent standard, the courts should not apply it to Haitian
deportees using the analytical framework the Court used in Auguste and In re J-E-. Rather, the courts should afford the petitioner with a rebuttable presumption that the persecutor
intends the natural and probable consequences of the persecutor's actions, and the courts should analyze the Haitian prison
system as a whole.
Finally, the Haitian policies and nation-wide hostility towards criminal deportees demonstrate that under either the
general intent standard or the specific intent standard, criminal
deportees to Haiti will experience torture if returned to Haiti.
Accordingly, they are eligible for Withholding of Removal under
the Convention against Torture.
ADDENDUM

Just before the printing of this article, the Second and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal decided cases in which the potential deportees suffered from some physical or mental
infirmity. 20 9 However, rather than relying on the willful blindness rationale in Lavira, the courts reasoned that the specific
intent standard could be met if there were sufficient evidence to
show that the applicant's condition would cause the applicant to
act inappropriately resulting in their being singled out for spe208 In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 310-11.
I take issue with [the majority's approach], which I fear can only lead to a derogation and not a meaningful implementation of our obligations under the Convention
Against Torture. Considering the limitations adopted by the majority in this case,

I find it difficult to conceive of the circumstances in which an individual might
qualify for our protection, as there will always be some basis for disqualification.
Id. See also Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating "Moreover,
requiring an alien to establish the specific intent of his/her persecutors could impose insurmountable obstacles to affording the very protections the community of
nations sought to guarantee under the Convention Against Torture.").
209 See Pierre v. Gonzales 502 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2007); Jean-Pierre v. U.S. Attorney General 500 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2007).
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cial abuse by prison guards. 2 10 Indeed, the Second Circuit explicitly repudiated the reasoning in Lavira, stating, "[we do not
see how these concepts [in Lavira], which may bear on knowledge to the extent they establish conscious avoidance, can without more demonstrate specific intent, which requires that the
actor intend the actual consequences of his conduct (as distinguished from the act that causes these consequences." 2 1 1 While
these cases hold much promise for sick or disabled applicants,
they fail to address two important issues. First, the Courts
have still not reconciled its specific standard with the traditional criminal intent standard. 2 12 Second, the Courts have ignored the evidence that American criminal deportees are
consistently singled out. The Eleventh Circuit even cited the
expert testimony of Michelle Karshan, stating that "[c]riminal
deportees from the United States are treated especially harshly,
and that they are sometimes 'beaten with metal wands because
the prison guards perceive them to be professional criminals de213
serving of the punishment.'

210
211
212
213

Pierre, 502 F.3d at 122; Jean-Pierre500 F.3d at 1323.
Pierre, 502 F.3d at 118.
See supra Part VI.A.2.
See Jean-Pierre,500 F.3d at 1319.
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